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Perceptions and Misperceptions: Exploring the U.S.-Russian 
Strategic Impasse 
by Jerome Conley and Mikhail Tsypkin  
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
In late November 2007, experts from the United States and the Russian Federation met in 
Washington, DC to discuss current bilateral relations and perceived opportunities and obstacles 
for addressing downward trends in this relationship. Sponsored by the Advanced Systems and 
Concepts Office (ASCO) of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Committee on 
International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the National Academies, the Foundation for 
Military Reform in Moscow, and the Institute for USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, these discussions included former and current officials from the military, technical, and 
policy communities of both countries.[1]  
 
The overriding issue that dominated the three days of presentations and dialogue was the impact 
of “perceptions and misperceptions” on current U.S.-Russian relations. In many aspects, the 
United States and Russia have similar security concerns regarding the threats posed by terrorism 
and WMD proliferation. Moreover, there was complete agreement among the fifty participants that 
the potential for deliberate hostilities between the two countries was nonexistent. However, these 
apparent “unifying factors” were not perceived as sufficient to overcome the bilateral uncertainty 
and misunderstanding that currently surround strategic modernization efforts in both countries. 
On several occasions, workshop participants mentioned that the state of bilateral tensions 
reminded them of the atmosphere that existed in the early 1980s. As one Russian participant 
observed, “The classic Cold War model is reemerging—don’t cooperate easily; don’t give them 
anything….”  
This somewhat pessimistic viewpoint was blunted, however, by the acknowledgement that 
important bilateral cooperation does takes place on a daily basis and these cooperative efforts 
are often underappreciated for their strategic significance. The continued success and 
transformation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, to include biological threat 
and hazard reduction projects; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT); the 
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP); and tremendous reductions in each country’s 
strategic arsenal sizes all highlight bilateral cooperation and synergy in very sensitive areas. In 
addition, GICNT and GNEP underscore the collaborative global leadership role that the United 
States and Russia are assuming in the area of WMD threat reduction. These efforts may not be 
flawless and it is easy for pundits to highlight their shortcomings, but workshop participants from 
both countries stated that the uniqueness and significance of these cooperative efforts should not 
be dismissed. Moreover, leveraging and building upon these and other existing efforts could 
provide a natural means for enhancing overall bilateral relations but must be complemented by 
concerted efforts to reduce misperceptions. In the immediate timeframe, therefore, there are 
several key areas where joint dialogue and improved mutual understanding can contribute to 
improved U.S.-Russian relations and simultaneously meet the individual security interests of both 
countries.  
The Nuclear Posture Review  
Six years after its delivery to Congress, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) remains a central 
source of misperception between the United States and Russia. Perhaps the greatest perception 
challenge of the report is overcoming the Congressionally-mandated title of the document in favor 
of one such as “Strategic Posture Review” in order to underscore the reduced role of nuclear 
weapons in U.S. strategic planning. In regards to the Russian Federation, a key finding of the 
NPR is the specific statement that Russia is not considered to be an immediate threat to the 
United States and it is in the interest of the United States to pursue cooperative efforts with the 
Russian Federation. Also important from a U.S.—Russian perspective is the fact that the first 
briefing of the Nuclear Posture Review to a foreign government was provided to General 
Baluyevskiy, the Chief of the Russian General Staff. American experts attending the November 
workshop therefore emphasized that the NPR represents a major doctrinal shift in the treatment 
of Russia that has changed over fifty-years of Soviet/Russian-centric threat planning and that the 
priority placed on briefing the NPR to Russian officials symbolized the sincerity of these changes.  
 
For Russian experts at the workshop, however, the symbolism and meaning of the Nuclear 
Posture Review are less clear. References were made during the discussions to purported 
classified sections of the NPR that are posted on the Internet and which mention continued 
concerns over Russia’s nuclear forces and programs and the potential need to revise U.S. 
nuclear forces and posture if U.S.-Russian relations worsen in the future. To this point, U.S. 
experts emphasized that they can’t validate what is and is not available on the Internet, but one 
must be cautious in reading any document that is not validated in its authenticity or which is 
presented in a fragmented manner and does not contain the full context for individual statements. 
Moreover, they argued, what cannot be disputed is that the NPR clearly states that a “new 
framework” for cooperation with Russian must be encouraged and facilitated and a relationship 
based on Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) ended.[2] For many of the participating U.S. experts, 
this is the most significant change they have seen in U.S. strategic planning during their careers 
and it is difficult for them to understand how this significance is not appreciated by their Russian 
counter-parts.  
Beyond this issue of how Russia is presented in the NPR, an equally troubling issue for the 
Russian participants was the concept of “global strike” contained within the NPR and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR). Global strike is understood by U.S. strategic 
planners to mean the pursuit of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities (to include conventional and 
nuclear weapons) that can respond to a threat anywhere in the world within a period of thirty 
minutes or less. This rapid, precision-strike capability is envisioned as both a surgical strike tool 
as well as a robust deterrent since it provides a flexible and responsive warfighting asset that can 
hold a broad range of targets at risk around the world.[3] From the Russian perspective, however, 
“global strike” represents a potential preemptive or first strike capability in which conventional—
and possibly nuclear—assets can surgically and rapidly decapitate Russia’s strategic arsenal. 
Global strike is also seen as an expansion of the American precision-strike expertise that first 
raised Russian strategic concerns during the 1999 NATO operations in the Balkans. These 
technical and operational capabilities received tremendous attention within Russian military 
circles and demonstrated an American supremacy in warfighting that elevated precision-guided 
munitions (PGMs) to the level of strategic assets. Russian concerns over American preemption 
capabilities were further fueled in 2006 following a Foreign Affairs article in which the authors 
argued that an emerging U.S. nuclear primacy may well lead to American confidence in its ability 
to conduct an assured first strike against Russia.[4] Though discredited by experts in both the 
United State and Russia as not technically, operationally or politically viable, this “nuclear 
primacy” argument added fuel to the simmering fire of U.S.-Russian strategic misperceptions.  
Beyond this issue of global strike, new and misunderstood terminology within the QDR and NPR 
also contributes to tensions between the United States and Russia. First and foremost is an 
American doctrinal shift to “capabilities-based planning” in which future U.S. force requirements 
are based on desired capabilities that can address a broad range of future threats. When briefing 
the findings from the NPR and QDR, U.S. participants clearly stated that the future threat 
environment was uncertain and difficult to predict, thus the United States must develop and foster 
capabilities that are not specific to one adversary and that are sufficient to respond to 
“unexpected and potential threat contingencies.” Russian military experts, however, stated their 
inability to understand how viable planning can be accomplished in the absence of specific 
employment scenarios. Moreover, the Russian translation for “capabilities-based planning” is “to 
develop maximum capabilities in every area”—an interpretation that creates a rather bellicose 
image of the United States. For these perception/misperception reasons, recommendations were 
put forward to conduct a joint research effort to develop a bilingual reference guide on strategic 
terminology and concepts.  
Nuclear Arsenal Size  
Russian and American experts at the meetings appeared to agree that ongoing unilateral 
reductions in their strategic arsenals represent a tremendous step forward in global 
nonproliferation efforts. In Russia, however, there is concern that these “START to SORTS” 
reductions within the United States are based mostly on the dismantlement or re-declaration of 
heavy bombers and the rearming of these bombers with conventional weapons. This creates a 
great “return potential” for the United States and an ability to return to previous strategic numbers 
for some delivery vehicles. In addition, despite the goal of 1,700 to 2,200 nuclear warheads in 
2010, Russian experts believe there is a 2,500 to 3,500 warhead “comeback or return potential” 
for the United States above these baseline numbers due to the nature of the stockpile 
stewardship program. In response to these concerns over the reconstitution capability of the U.S. 
strategic stockpile and delivery vehicles, American experts stated that while this capability does 
exist in theory, it is a very complicated endeavor and process and would not take days or weeks 
but rather months or longer to execute.  
Concerning the near-term future of Russia’s nuclear stockpile, experts from the Russian 
Federation stated that Russia will have 800-1,000 land-based warheads and approximately 600 
naval and 400 air-leg warheads. Moreover, the Russian Federation does not believe it needs to 
go to the highest threshold of these numbers or to the numbers allowed by the Moscow Treaty 
since a decision was made in 2005 in the Russian Security Council—and agreed upon by 
President Putin—to not try to reach numeric parity with the United States but rather to achieve a 
“balance of capabilities.” This decision seems to represent a capabilities-based argument in that 
overall numbers do not matter, only the operational capabilities of the various systems and 
warheads. And while Russian strategic modernization from the U.S. perspective is also providing 
Russia with a first strike capability[5], Russian experts stated that ongoing modernization in 
command and control, SSBN and Topol-M forces is a serious and costly investment in a 
survivable second strike capability.  
Nuclear Alert and “Hair-trigger” Postures  
An additional area of significant disagreement and misperception between the American and 
Russian experts at the November 2007 workshop was the status and meaning of nuclear alert 
postures in both countries. Russian experts repeatedly made reference to an American “hair-
trigger” posture and the potential for this perceived posture to create a tight crisis response time 
or an increased vulnerability to an unauthorized launch.  
 
In regards to the Russian perception that U.S. strategic forces are postured for rapid nuclear 
release, American experts highlighted that U.S. bombers are off alert; there is a reduced bomber 
role in U.S. war plans; a reduced ICBM force; and submarines have a reduced posture with fewer 
numbers are at sea, a relaxed range from potential targets and are not in constant 
communications with national command. Moreover, U.S. submarines are at sea because of 
survivability—not rapid response of strategic forces—so the U.S. posture is focused on the ability 
to always strike second, not an ability to strike first. In addition, at least one U.S. expert 
emphasized that pushing to reduce alert statuses through de-alerting initiatives can be 
destabilizing as this can give an adversary the incentive to preempt.[6] The real concern, 
according to this American expert, should be the survivability of strategic forces and the United 
States is therefore posturing forces so they are stable and survivable and not to gain any 
incentive to attack first. Interestingly, this argument of posturing for survivability rather than a first-
strike capability was the same explanation made by the Russian experts for their ongoing 
modernization efforts.  
Concerning the potential vulnerability and risk of unauthorized use created by U.S. alert postures, 
an American expert explained that in addition to a robust set of negative technical and procedural 
controls to prevent unauthorized use, American weapon systems are also loaded with training 
packages and targeted on ocean areas. So even if they could theoretically be launched, these 
weapons would target only ocean areas. In response to a question about the unauthorized 
movement of nuclear cruise missiles from Minot, an American expert  
 
emphasized that these missiles were not part of the U.S. alert forces but this does not negate the 
need for proper planning and accountability of all nuclear assets. In addition, a Russian military 
expert agreed that Russian and American forces have a robust capability to block the launch of 
their nuclear forces through the use of negative control systems, but a significant difference in the 
Russian approach is that they have a “zero flight plan” loaded into the computers on their missiles 
and the system is not able to receive launch orders with this zero flight plan loaded. Therefore, 
one would have to enter a flight plan before the computer can receive orders and this is almost 
impossible for people trying to execute an unauthorized launch.  
A final area of significant concern for some Russian military experts regarding the posturing of 
U.S. nuclear forces relates to the potential use of American nuclear assets in a regional context 
when the survivability of the United States is not at stake. According to some Russians, the U.S. 
nuclear doctrine theoretically allows the United States to use nuclear weapons in a regional 
context away from the United States when U.S. interests are at stake but the actual survivability 
of the United States as a nation is not at risk. Russian nuclear doctrine, however, only permits the 
use of nuclear capabilities when actual national survival is at risk. This, according to the Russian 
experts, is the most prominent doctrinal area where Russia and the United States differ.  
In response to these perceptions and misperceptions over U.S. and Russian nuclear postures, 
two primary recommendations were put forward by the Russian participants. One expert 
emphasized the importance of having bilateral confidence in existing negative control procedures 
and the need to have Russian and American C3 experts sit down together and quietly analyze 
this problem. Control and blocking (i.e. negative controls), he argued, is the right area for bilateral 
cooperation and discussion and can be done without the risk that either country will enter into 
each other’s sensitive positive control areas. Such a discussion between U.S. and Russian C3 
experts was initiated ten years ago in California but nothing permanent came of this effort.[7]  
A second Russian recommendation concerned establishing three different levels or degrees of 
alert for strategic forces in the United States. “High alert” can be established for a limited number 
of weapons (~500) that are sufficient for regional contingencies but not enough to cover all of 
Russia. “Medium alert”—the ability to launch in days to weeks—can include bringing weapons 
and bombers back together for eventual weapon delivery. “Low alert” would be for the majority of 
nuclear weapons which would be disassembled as part of their “low alert” status and therefore 
require time to reassemble . From the Russian perspective, these three levels would ensure a 
minimal, assured second strike capability but the United States would not be able to execute its 
entire target list immediately. This approach would also allow the United States to signal to 
regional actors by ramping up alert status in response to rising tensions.[8]  
Ballistic Missile Defense  
Ballistic missile defense in Europe emerged as an important political and symbolic theme during 
the workshop. Russian participants emphasized the perception that the United States was 
showing a lack of respect for the Russian Federation by attempting to push forward with the BMD 
sites in Poland and the Czech Republic without giving adequate consideration for Russian views. 
According to the Russian experts, the proposed BMD system does in fact have a limited 
capability against Russian systems and though this would have a negligible impact on the overall 
Russian deterrent, the unwillingness of the United States to acknowledge this limited capability 
was considered a diplomatic snub. In addition, a published analysis from one of the participants 
addressed the political aspects of BMD:  
One of the reasons for Moscow’s sharp reaction to Washington’s missile defense plans is the 
arrogance with which the incumbent White House administration makes unilateral decisions on 
strategic issues. And although U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted that Moscow 
had been informed about U.S. plans to deploy missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech 
Republic on a dozen occasions, apparently this is not the type of format for relations that suits 
Russia. Rice’s statement evoked immediate reaction from European leaders, who called for close 
consultations on missile defense problems in a U.S.-NATO-Russia dialogue. An even more 
constructive solution would be Russia’s direct participation in developing and jointly using not only 
a European antimissile system, but also a global system.[9]  
Moreover, several of the Russian presenters underscored that a joint BMD capability in Europe 
would enhance bilateral relations and overall system effectiveness based on both the technical 
enhancements as well as the important symbolic value of a joint defense against Iran and other 
emerging threats. Among the short-term opportunities for overcoming the bilateral impasse on 
BMD were the recommendations for joint analysis on threats, a follow-up to the 2005 joint 
tabletop exercise on ballistic missile defense against third-party actors[10], and a joint study on 
information exchange requirements during BMD operations.  
U.S. experts also pointed to the political aspects of BMD and stated that Russia’s reaction to 
BMD in Europe was in fact primarily political since U.S. officials briefed their Russian counter-
parts about the possibility of a third site in Europe for several years and so it was not a surprise. 
One American participant reminded the participants that cooperation with Russia in ballistic 
missile defense was an important recommendation in the Nuclear Posture Review and therefore 
not something that the current administration opposed. Moreover, borrowing from the same 
article previously referenced, U.S. BMD capabilities in Europe do not have the technical capability 
to threaten Russia’s nuclear deterrent:  
The extension of the U.S. missile defense system will not threaten Russia’s nuclear-missile 
potential in the near future, that is, until around the year 2015. The flight paths of Russian 
strategic missiles, capable of hypothetically deterring the U.S., indeed pass outside the 
antimissile operation zone in Europe, especially since they are designed to destroy warheads in 
mid-flight, rather than shoot down missiles at the boost stage. Moreover, Russian strategic 
missiles are equipped with such powerful ABM defense suppression systems and other assets, 
including hundreds of decoy targets and jamming stations, that even with “favorable” (in terms of 
missile defense) flight paths, as many as ten antimissiles would be needed to destroy just one 
warhead. Therefore, President Vladimir Putin and ex-Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov were quite 
right when they said that no missile defense system poses a threat to Russia’s strategic missiles. 
This will also hold true even if the U.S. deploys ten such bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Ditto for missile defense bases on U.S. soil.[11] 
Taken together, these Russian and American arguments and sentiments clearly point to the 
ongoing bilateral impasse being anchored in political realities, not technical or operational 
capabilities.  
The Russian experts attending the November workshop provided several possible joint 
approaches for overcoming the BMD impasse. First on the list was for the United States to agree 
to not deploy ground-based interceptors (GBI) in Europe until a threat emerges. This, the 
Russians argued, would not cost the United State anything in an operational sense since the 
proposed GBI site in Poland—if approved—would not be ready for many years. From the Russian 
side this type of U.S. declaration would provide some assurances that the United States would 
consult with Russia before expanding its BMD footprint in Europe. An additional proposal was for 
a joint deployment of existing U.S. and Russian systems to meet near-term BMD needs, such as 
the S-300/400 systems, PAC-3, Arrow, Aegis, etc. This would ensure protection for Southern 
Europe, Turkey, and Greece. Moreover, this type of arrangement would constitute a quasi 
alliance against Iran and also provide a clear signaling capability to potential adversaries. Finally, 
if the Memorandum of Understanding for the Joint Data Exchange Center is implemented, this 
would integrate some aspects of Russian and American missile defense and could also make the 
United States “third site” in the Czech Republic a de facto cooperative effort if JDEC utilized its 
data.  
NPT Article 6  
 
Understanding NPT Article 6 commitments and obligations within the 21st century risk 
environment was another significant and recurring theme during the workshop. Participants 
explored the possibility of creating a bilateral study group to look at the original intention of the 
NPT and the global risk environment at that time and whether these timelines and obligations 
were being adequately met through unilateral reductions. Included in this analysis could be a 
discussion of whether a perceived emphasis on nuclear weapons in national strategies 
undermines NPT obligations. Finally, existing rules and guidelines for the regimes and 
agreements that support the NPT were considered inadequate for international coordination and 
cooperation in the 21st century and thus in need of some revision.  
 
Tactical Nuclear Weapons  
In the course of the discussion on NPT Article 6 obligations, U.S. experts stated that 
consideration must also be given to accounting for tactical nuclear weapons and whether Russia 
is making serious efforts to reduce and account for its stockpile. Russian experts responded that 
they did not understand this U.S. concern because Russian tactical nuclear weapons are all 
stored on Russian territory while the United States has a few hundred deployed in Europe. 
Moreover, they argued, loose nuclear weapons are more of a Pakistani issue—and sometimes a 
U.S. Air Force issue.[12] But while Russia is unhappy about U.S. tactical nuclear weapons being 
deployed in Europe, one expert stated that it might be counterproductive to have the United 
States remove all of its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe since some European countries may 
then change their minds on not needing their own nuclear capabilities. And in response to the U.S. 
inquiry about weapon accountability, several of the Russian experts stated that a confidential 
exchange of information regarding the status of U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons was 
possible and had been raised with DOE officials a few years ago.[13] Specifically, this exchange 
of information would not involve a verification regime but rather a confidential dialogue on where 
and what is stored.[14]  
Final Thoughts  
In closing the discussion on the future of U.S.-Russian relations, a Russian expert underscored 
that both countries recently celebrated the first 200 years of their bilateral relationship. For the 
first 150 years, Russia and the United States were allies or quasi-allies. World War II was a high 
point in this relationship despite Stalin and the ideological differences between the two countries. 
The end of World War II led to a bipolar environment during the Cold War, but the United States 
and Russia were partners in the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). With the end of 
the Cold War came a “unipolar moment” when both presidents declared strategic partnership but 
the lack of symmetry allowed the United States to move unilaterally. Now, the world is moving 
back to a multi-polar system due to globalization, and historically, Russia and the United States 
have never been enemies in a multi-polar world.  
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